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A	patriotic	painting	depicting	the	Turkish	army’s	entry	into	Izmir	after	the	defeat	of	the	Greeks	during	the	Turkish	war	of	
independence.	The	five	men	in	the	centre	are,	from	left	to	right,	Kazim	Karabekir	Pasha,	Ismet	Pasha	(later	Ismet	Inonu),	
Mustafa	Kemal	Pasha	(later,	Mustafa	Kemal	Ataturk),	Fahrettin	Pasha	(later	Omer	Fahrettin	Turkkan),	and	Fevzi	Pasha	
(later	Fevzi	Cakmak).	—	Wikipedia	
WHILE	Turkish	politics	often	tend	toward	the	dramatic,	the	language	currently	being	used	by	both	
government	and	opposition	figures	is	remarkably	volatile.		
During	the	AKP	campaign	in	April,	while	promoting	the	referendum	that	will	now	reorganise	the	
Turkish	government	around	an	executive	presidency,	the	country’s	most	prominent	political	figures	and	
commentators	inveighed	against	their	political	opponents,	at	home	and	abroad.	In	response	to	
prohibitions	against	Turkish	campaign	rallies	in	Europe,	president	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan’s	loyalists	
took	to	calling	their	German	and	Dutch	critics	Nazis	and	fascists.	Leading	members	of	the	government	
regularly	labelled	referendum	opponents	inside	Turkey	as	traitors.	
In	the	midst	of	these	superlatives	and	insults,	it	is	easy	to	miss	or	dismiss	messages	that	have	a	deeper	
significance	for	domestic	Turkish	audiences.	One	of	the	most	resounding	and	consistent	of	these	tropes	
draws	on	particular	traumatic	and	formative	events	from	the	nation’s	history.	
Time	and	again,	both	government	officials	and	their	allies	have	suggested	that	Turkey	is	experiencing	a	
‘second	war	of	independence.’	While	one	may	consider	this	yet	another	manifestation	of	casual	
hyperbole,	there	is	nothing	trivial	about	the	repeated	use	of	this	phrase.	Regardless	of	their	background	
or	convictions,	for	most	Turks,	references	to	Turkey’s	original	‘war	of	independence’	signifies	a	common	
set	of	principles	and	fears	many	citizens	share.	By	invoking	Turkey’s	original	struggle	for	freedom,	the	
AKP	government	and	its	allies	are	playing	upon	Turkish	society’s	most	fundamental	impulses	and	
apprehensions.	The	result	of	this	rhetorical	turn	may	have	lasting,	and	potentially	very	violent,	
consequences	for	Turkey’s	future.	
Turkey’s	war	for	independence	
TURKEY’S	war	of	independence	lasted	from	the	spring	of	1919	to	the	fall	of	1922.	Through	these	three	
years	of	intense	fighting,	the	Turkish	republic	came	into	being,	and	the	Ottoman	empire	was	finally	
dismantled	and	repudiated.	It	was	during	this	era	that	Mustafa	Kemal	Ataturk	established	himself	as	the	
country’s	founding	father.	There	is	little	doubt	that	his	hard	earned	victory	over	the	Greeks	and	their	
allies	in	1922	provided	the	moral	basis	for	Ataturk’s	subsequent	cultural	and	political	revolution.	
Following	the	horrors	and	humiliating	defeat	of	the	First	World	War,	it	was	a	pivotal	and	uniquely	
redeeming	moment	in	the	country’s	history.	
To	understand	how	most	Turks	interpret	this	history	(and	apply	its	lessons	to	the	present),	a	basic	
appreciation	for	how	it	is	taught	and	portrayed	in	Turkey	is	key.	During	elementary	school,	all	Turkish	
school	children	are	required	to	take	lessons	about	what	is	called	‘Revolutionary	History	and	Ataturkism.’	
As	an	element	of	Turkey’s	national	curriculum,	this	course	represents	the	most	rigorous	exposure	to	
history	a	Turkish	citizen	receives	at	school.	
The	course,	which	is	reiterated	in	high	school	(and	possibly	university	as	well),	is	almost	entirely	drawn	
from	Ataturk’s	own	personal	retelling	of	the	origins	and	implications	of	the	Turkish	War	of	
Independence.	A	disproportionate	amount	of	time	is	spent	on	the	actions	and	supposed	motivations	of	
the	many	characters	who	partook	in	the	independence	struggle.	While	underscoring	Ataturk’s	
contribution	to	the	war	effort	(as	both	a	general	and	a	statesman),	the	course	goes	to	great	lengths	in	
emphasising	the	malevolence	and	duplicity	of	the	war’s	core	losers.	
Unlike	advanced	courses	or	preparatory	exams	in	American	history,	a	standard	set	of	textbooks	are	used	
for	the	class	in	all	schools	across	the	country.	Judging	from	past	course	materials,	the	course’s	core	
narrative	and	conclusions	have	hardly	deviated	from	their	original	iterations	in	the	early	twentieth	
century.	
There	are	many	aspects	of	the	Turkish	war	of	independence	that	make	its	retelling	convoluted	and	
challenging	for	any	course,	let	alone	one	with	a	clear	ideological	purpose.	The	period	between	1919	and	
1922	was,	for	example,	as	much	a	civil	war	as	it	was	a	fight	between	occupiers	and	resisters.	At	no	point	
during	the	conflict	did	the	creation	of	the	Turkish	Republic	appear	fated	or	predestined.	Anatolia’s	
inhabitants	were	deeply	divided	over	the	future	of	their	government,	as	well	as	who	or	what	would	
serve	as	a	genuine	source	of	leadership	and	sovereignty.	
As	late	as	1922,	large	segments	of	the	population	opposed	Mustafa	Kemal’s	forces	and	were	loyal	to	the	
Ottoman	sultan.	Though	he	did	not	officially	repudiate	the	sultan	or	the	notion	of	empire	until	after	the	
war	was	over,	Ataturk	pointedly	attacked	supporters	of	the	sultan’s	government	as	traitors	and	foreign	
sympathisers.	Even	more	frequently,	treason	during	the	War	of	Independence	was	defined	along	
sectarian	and	ethnic	lines.	Ataturk’s	camp	considered	all	Muslims	natural	supporters	of	their	cause	
despite	profound	internal	differences	over	matters	of	politics	and	society.	By	contrast,	Ataturk	and	his	
supporters	depicted	Christians,	be	they	Armenians	or	Greeks,	as	prone	to	foreign	collaboration.	Others	
among	Ataturk’s	inner	circle	privately	cast	suspicions	upon	Muslim	minorities,	be	they	Kurds,	Alevis,	or	
Circassians,	as	incapable	of	being	fully	trustworthy.	Violence	and	massacres	committed	by	Greek	troops,	
as	well	as	native	Christian	and	Muslim	auxiliaries	and	rebels,	were	considered	by	many	as	definitive	
proof	for	these	misgivings.	
In	retelling	the	War	of	Independence,	the	Turkish	textbooks	by	no	means	disregard	these	internal	rifts	
and	incongruities.	Instead,	Ataturk’s	delayed	rejection	of	the	Ottoman	sultan	and	the	empire	is	depicted	
as	a	prudent	and	politically	astute	ruse	in	the	service	of	preparing	the	population	for	secular	republican	
rule.	The	fact	that	large	numbers	of	Muslim	and	Christian	defied	Mustafa	Kemal’s	leadership	is	similarly	
explained	and	dismissed.	Internal	uprisings	and	popular	opposition	to	Kemalism	are	represented,	as	
treason	born	either	out	of	foreign	meddling,	anti-Turkish	prejudice,	or	reactionary	politics.	
Today’s	‘war	of	Independence’	
WHATEVER	aversion	Turkey’s	current	president	may	have	toward	Kemalism	and	self-declared	
Kemalists,	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan	has	embraced,	almost	in	its	entirety,	the	traditional	narrative	and	
conclusions	of	the	War	of	Independence,	as	expressed	in	the	Turkish	curriculum.	He	references	the	war	
on	a	consistent	basis,	often	within	the	context	of	far	flung	analogies	and	examples	drawn	from	Turkish	
history.	
In	his	estimation,	Turkey	has	long	been	involved	in	a	life	or	death	struggle	against	enemies	lurking	at	
home	and	abroad.	Both	then	and	now,	rival	foreign	powers	and	native	traitors	threaten	the	country’s	
very	existence.	While	often	coy	in	naming	the	states	standing	against	Turkey,	Erdogan	has	openly	named	
the	groups	he	deems	traitorous	and	threatening:	Gulenists,	Kurdish	militants,	supporters	of	the	Gezi	
Park	demonstrations.	
While	calling	the	attempted	coup	of	July	2016	‘the	most	serious	hardship	since	the	war	of	
independence’,	Erdogan	has	also	repeatedly	assured	his	audience	that	Turks	are	destined	to	emerge	
from	today’s	crises	victorious.	For	Erdogan,	Turkey’s	success	in	the	War	of	Independence	stands	as	
‘proof	of	what	the	Turkish	nation	can	do	in	the	worst	of	times.’	
Erdogan’s	surrogates	in	the	press	are	even	more	explicit	and	threatening	when	drawing	parallels	
between	contemporary	events	and	the	War	of	Independence.	Ibrahim	Karagul,	editor	of	the	pro-AKP	
daily	Yeni	Safak,	regularly	implores	his	readers	to	stand	ready	to	defend	the	nation	from	an	
inconceivably	grand	alliance	of	adversaries	(a	list	that	has	at	various	times	included	the	United	States,	
the	European	Union,	Iran,	Russia,	Saudi	Arabia,	ISIS,	Gulenists,	the	PKK	and	YPG).	As	it	was	almost	a	
century	ago,	he	claims,	the	true	goal	of	this	conspiracy	is	to	partition	Turkey	and	bring	it	to	ruin.	
Notably,	Karagul	has	gone	out	of	his	way	to	expand	upon	Erdogan’s	criticism	of	the	territorial	
concessions	Ataturk	made	in	signing	the	Treaty	of	Lausanne,	the	1923	international	agreement	that	
ended	the	war	of	independence.	Erdogan,	he	declared,	will	draw	a	‘new	regional	map’	for	the	Middle	
East,	one	in	defiance	of	‘western	crusaders’	and	their	local	allies.	
How	the	Turkish	public	has	received	these	musing	about	the	past	and	present	is	not	entirely	clear.	The	
Republic	Peoples’	Party,	which	was	founded	by	Ataturk	and	is	most	commonly	know	by	its	Turkish	
acronym,	CHP,	still	prides	itself	as	the	embodiment	of	Ataturk’s	revolution.	At	CHP	organised	rallies,	
protesters	are	often	heard	chanting,	‘we	are	the	soldiers	of	Mustafa	Kemal.’	For	many	secular	Turks,	the	
legacy	of	the	War	of	Independence	belongs	to	those	who	most	closely	follow	Ataturk’s	dictates	and	
example.	
For	supporters	of	the	AKP,	there	are	signs	they	are	appropriating	the	physical	struggle	for	Turkey’s	
independence	in	a	much	more	literal	sense.	In	the	last	year,	it	has	become	commonplace	for	AKP	
supporters	to	compare	those	who	resisted	the	coup	on	the	night	of	July	15th	to	the	volunteers	who	first	
joined	Mustafa	Kemal	in	the	fight	against	the	Greeks	in	1919.	‘The	nation’s	epic	resistance	on	July	15th’,	
as	one	governor	recently	put	it,	‘like	19	May	1919,	brought	fear	to	oppressors,	hope	to	the	oppressed	
and	was	an	example	to	other	nations.’	Several	reports	since	last	summer	have	spoken	of	citizens	
acquiring	arms	and	forming	volunteer	militias.	There	have	been	images	and	Internet	postings	in	the	
mold	of	Mehmet	Aybek,	the	local	AKP	activist	who	posed	with	a	machine	gun	while	declaring	his	
willingness	to	kill	upon	Erdogan’s	order.	
To	some	extent,	this	rhetoric	reflects	long-standing	national	insecurities	within	Turkish	politics.	
Resentment	towards	the	United	States	and	western	European	states,	especially	in	light	of	the	wars	in	
Iraq	and	Syria,	runs	deep	within	many	branches	of	Turkish	society.	Erdogan	has	been	particularly	
successful	at	harnessing	this	bitterness,	often	projecting	it	back	as	a	phenomenon	generations	in	the	
making.	In	repeatedly	conjuring	up	the	notion	of	a	new	War	of	Independence,	Erdogan	has	subtlety	cast	
himself	as	the	nation’s	savior	akin	to	Mustafa	Kemal-	going	so	far,	last	year,	as	to	name	himself	as	both	
president	and	commander-in-chief,	much	like	Ataturk	did	in	1922.	
A	dangerous	rhetorical	turn	
THESE	messages	should	give	Turks	pause,	and	remind	them	of	past	attempts	to	resurrect	history	for	
contemporary	political	purposes.	Violent	romantic	fantasies	about	the	past	have	regularly	served	to	
create	and	accelerate	communal	conflict.	Slobadan	Milosevic’s	repeated	allusions	to	Serbia’s	supposed	
history	of	oppression	by	Ottoman	Muslims	provided	justification	for	the	horrors	inflicted	upon	civilians	
in	Bosnia	and	Kosova.	Similarly,	Russian	nationalists	have	long	indulged	in	distorted	memories	of	
violence	and	conquest	to	justify	contemporary	events	in	the	Caucasus	and	the	Ukraine.	
Given	what	is	at	stake,	Erdogan’s	insistence	that	Turkey’s	war	of	independence	is	repeating	itself	may	
have	truly	frightful	consequences.	Claiming	that	today’s	political	dissidents	are	no	different	from	the	
Greeks	and	rebellious	Muslims	of	a	century	ago	implies	that	such	opponents	need	to	be	fought	on	the	
same	terms.	To	make	this	clear,	the	government	need	not	spell	out	its	argument	in	precise	terms.	
Thanks	to	the	uniform	Turkish	education	system,	every	Turkish	citizen	understands	exactly	what	they	
mean.	
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